La Trobe University Islamic Banking and Finance Symposium

Would Islamic Finance have prevented the global financial crisis?

Mohammed Amin 6 July 2009



#### Overview

Preamble

Global financial crisis - effects

Global financial crisis – causes?

Introduction to Islamic Finance

Would Islamic Finance have prevented the global financial crisis?

#### Preamble

**Disclaimers** 

**About Mohammed Amin** 

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#### **Mohammed Amin**



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#### He is:


- a member of HM Treasury's Islamic Finance Experts Group, set up to advise the Government on Islamic finance strategy
- chairman of the Business & Economics Committee of the Muslim Council of Britain
- a Council member of the Chartered Institute of Taxation
- a member of the Policy & Technical Committee of the Association of Corporate Treasurers

Many of Amin's previous articles and presentations on Islamic Finance can be found on his Islamic Finance blog at:

pwc.blogs.com/islamicfinance

#### Global financial crisis - effects

## The US Treasuries / Eurodollar Libor (TED) spread



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# IMF Global Financial Stability Report April 2009 estimated bank writedowns 2007-2010

\$US billion	% of total assets
1,049	8.8
316	5.0
1.109	4.6
	3.5
	5.5 <b>5.</b> 4
	1,049

# Falls in bank share prices

	1 or 2 Jan 2007	Lowest price	Date
	ΦΕΟ ΟΟ	фо <b>07</b>	0/0/0000
Citigroup	\$56.28	\$0.97	2/3/2009
Bank of America	\$54.18	\$2.53	16/2/2009
David Dank of Coatland	500 54n	40.25	20/4/2000
Royal Bank of Scotland	582.51p	10.3p	20/1/2009
Lloyds TSB	577.35	42p	6/3/2009


### Why bank share prices matter

Ability to remain in business

**Lehman Brothers** 

Temporary restrictions on short selling financial shares

## The downward spiral



#### Global financial crisis – causes?

Sub-prime mortgages

Incentive effects of securitisation

Co-mingling in CDOs


Monoline insurers

Insurers selling credit default swaps

US government sponsored enterprises


Over leveraging generally

#### Sub-prime mortgages




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#### Banking the old fashioned way



# New banking - "originate and sell"



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#### The role of securitisation


Basic securitisation

Collateralised debt obligations


CDO squared

Government sponsored enterprises

### Collateralised debt obligations




# Tranching and "waterfall"



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# Asset sale securitisation Basic structure



#### Why regulated entities securitise

Capital requirement for pool of bank loans:

Pool of bank loans £100

Bank capital required

£ 8


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
#### Can a bank let its SPE's fail?

Banks bringing structured investment vehicles (SIVs) back onto balance sheet Impact on capital ratios


#### CDO squared



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#### Insurance companies selling credit default swaps - "CDS"



NB: Buyer need not own the reference asset

#### Government sponsored enterprises



Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) total assets \$919 bn at 31 March 2009

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) \$947 bn at 31 March 2009


IMF forecasts \$250 billion of losses in US GSEs

## Over leveraging generally

#### Interest tax deductible

- Private equity
- Commercial companies generally: "efficient balance sheets"

#### Introduction to Islamic Finance




#### Islamic contracts with "conventional" economics

Murabaha


Ijara

# Synthesising debt Commodity murabaha or tawarruq



Equivalent to 5% interest bearing loan by Bank to Customer

# Ijara




# Islamic contracts with financier risk sharing

Mudaraba

Some sukuk

# Mudaraba – partnership with one capital provider



#### Islamic bank's liabilities

Current account

Deposit account

- Interest free deposit
- No return

 Profit and loss sharing investment account (mudaraba)

# Conventional bank balance sheet

Bank assets

**Bank liabilities** 

Bank equity

Repayable in full

Full impact of asset gains / losses

# Islamic bank balance sheet

Bank assets

Bank liabilities

Profit sharing investment accounts

Bank equity

Repayable in full, invested in "safe" assets

Share in asset profits but also bear losses on assets


Reduced impact of asset gains / losses

#### Sukuk

The Islamic equivalent of bonds


- Goal replicate characteristics of conventional bonds without infringing the rules of Shariah
- No legal debt involved
- Can be bought and sold between holders of the instrument without affecting the company
- Provides finance for a fixed period of time (typically 3–5 years)
- Provides investors with a flow of regular payments without involving interest
- Usually written under New York or English law

# Ijara sukuk – conventional economics



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# Mudaraba sukuk – risk sharing economics



#### What's different about Islamic finance?

Caveat emptor v requirement for ethical dealing

Don't lend if customer should not borrow

Prohibition of debt trading

Prohibition of gharar (CDO<sup>2</sup>, derivatives)

Risk sharing by PSIA holders

Risk sharing by some sukuk holders

#### Concluding comment

Islamic Finance distributes risk differently from conventional finance.

Many of its features would have made the global financial crisis much less likely.

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